Corporate agency and possible futures by Mulgan, Tim
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3887-1
ORIGINAL PAPER
Corporate Agency and Possible Futures
Tim Mulgan1,2 
Received: 13 January 2017 / Accepted: 21 April 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust—one that will help future people to cope with challenges 
posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future 
people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future 
philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues 
that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) 
to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.
Keywords Collective agency · Corporate agency · Corporate responsibility · Future people · Climate change · Broken 
world · Virtual reality · Artificial intelligence
In this paper, I ask how future people might rethink the 
moral status of corporate groups, and what we can learn 
from reflection on their moral thinking. "Why Should We 
Think About Possible Futures?" section explains why we 
should care about possible futures,  "The Present Debate 
About Corporate Agency" section introduces the current 
debate about corporate agency, while "Broken Futures" and 
"Digital Futures" sections argue that people living in broken 
and digital futures will think very differently about corporate 
agency.
Why Should We Think About Possible 
Futures?
There is a substantial philosophical literature on the 
moral status of groups and collectives (e.g. French 1979; 
Velasquez 2003; Copp 2007; List and Pettit 2011; Hess 
2013; Hindriks 2014; and the other works cited below). 
I focus here on groups that have both a structure and a 
decision-making process, as opposed to merely aggregate 
groups such as ‘the people currently in Heathrow Terminal 
5’. I refer to these as ‘corporate groups’ (Tollefsen 2015, 
p. 3).1 Our social world includes many corporate groups, 
such as business enterprises, legally incorporated entities, 
bureaucratic organisations, public bodies, clubs, societies, 
juries, judicial panels, or committees. We acknowledge the 
existence of corporate groups; we enter into contractual 
relationships with them; we recognise their legal person-
ality; we accord them certain rights; we attribute goals, 
desires, and intentions to them; and we hold them respon-
sible for their actions or inactions.
Why should we think about possible futures? In particu-
lar, why should we care what future people might think 
about corporate groups? I argue in "Broken Futures" sec-
tion that people in possible broken futures will be more 
likely (for philosophical reasons) to accept the reality of 
corporate moral agency, but also more reluctant (for his-
torical, philosophical, and social reasons) to recognise 
the moral agency of corporate groups that cannot prove 
themselves to be morally reliable. In "Digital Futures" sec-
tion, I argue that people in possible digital futures will 
acknowledge uploaded or artificial digital beings as moral 
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1 While “corporate group” is slightly clumsy, alternatives such as 
“collective” or “corporate agent” bias the debate in favour of a col-
lectivist interpretation. Note that “corporate group” is broader than 
“corporation”, which refers only to legally incorporated entities. I use 
“business enterprise” to cover all firms whether legally incorporated 
or not. (I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for pressing me to 
clarify my terms here.)
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persons, and that this recognition will lead them both to 
acknowledge some corporate groups as persons, but also to 
be even more wary of morally unreliable corporate groups. 
Suppose you accept all these speculations about future peo-
ple’s beliefs. Why should you care? What impact should 
future beliefs have on our current thinking about corporate 
groups?
Your initial answer may depend on your methodologi-
cal priorities. Philosophical accounts of corporate groups 
serve many different purposes. I distinguish three alterna-
tive approaches: realists seek to explore a metaphysical 
reality that exists independently of our aims and practices; 
pragmatists ask which account of corporate groups best 
serves our practical purposes; and interpretivists interpret 
our current social practice of holding corporate groups to 
account.2
Pragmatists will definitely find my project important. If 
we seek to develop and bequeath an account of corporate 
groups that serves our practical purposes, and if we care 
about future people at all, then we need to know what they 
will find useful or credible. This is especially true for con-
sequentialists, who seek to maximise well-being into the 
distant future.
Knowledge of possible futures is also relevant for inter-
pretivists. Our practice of dealing with corporate groups 
is part of our general practice of holding one another to 
account. And the latter contains several future-directed 
elements. Our moral norms include many explicitly future-
directed obligations: to future people in general, to our 
descendants, to future inhabitants of this place, to future 
citizens of this polity, to future stakeholders in this corpo-
rate group, and so on. And any social practice implicitly 
regards itself as extending indefinitely into the future. The 
best interpretation of our present practice will be sensitive 
to future threats.
Both pragmatists and interpretivists thus seek a tempo-
rally robust account of corporate groups: one that provides 
the inhabitants of a broad range of credible futures with the 
conceptual resources they need to recognise, constrain, and 
hopefully avoid the particular threats that are most salient to 
them. At the very least, we must not bequeath a philosophi-
cal story about corporate groups that leaves future people 
unable to recognise the most worrying threats or prevents 
them from addressing them.
Realists, by contrast, may regard speculation about pos-
sible futures as irrelevant.3 What matters is the truth about 
corporate groups, not what anyone believes. Discovering 
future beliefs should not affect present beliefs, because we 
have no reason to regard future people as more reliable than 
ourselves. And, of course, we are really dealing here with 
present predictions about future beliefs, not established facts 
about those beliefs. Even if future people will know better, 
we cannot non-question-beggingly help ourselves to future 
metaphysical discoveries!
I reply that even realists should care about possible 
futures, for two reasons. First, possible futures are relevant 
to realists qua realists because they transform philosophi-
cal thought experiments into real cases. In the rest of this 
paper, I discuss societies where self-sufficient survival is 
impossible, Rawlsian favourable conditions no longer apply, 
scarcity is ubiquitous, and historical justifications of prop-
erty rights are no longer credible; and futures containing 
AIs capable of passing the Turing Test, outwitting humans, 
or forming corporate groups as complex as human brains. 
All these presently imaginary scenarios are more significant 
when we realise they might actually happen. This is because, 
as most realists will agree, even if we ideally seek to accom-
modate all conceivable cases, any acceptable metaphysical 
theory must accommodate all actual cases (past, present, and 
future). Any realist who thinks actual cases have some prior-
ity over imaginary ones should therefore pay some attention 
to possible futures.
More importantly, realists should care about possible 
futures because no realist is only a realist. Virtually no one 
believes that pragmatic and interpretive questions are unim-
portant, or that it doesn’t matter how we actually treat cor-
porate groups. Every realist philosopher is also a citizen in 
a society threatened by morally unreliable corporate groups, 
and a participant in our practice of holding corporate groups 
to account. Even if she had no interest in possible futures 
qua realist philosopher, she should still consider them in 
her other social roles.
Some realists will remain unsatisfied. If we foresee that 
future ethics will be (e.g.) racist, shouldn’t we resist it rather 
than embracing it? I reply that a temporally robust ethic must 
satisfy three distinct criteria. (1) It must strike future peo-
ple as plausible. (2) It must enable them to recognise and 
address salient ethical threats. (3) But it must also not strike 
us—after reflection on possible futures—as ethically unac-
ceptable. If people in possible future F can only survive by 
embracing racism, tribalism, or xenophobia, then there is 
no ethic that is temporally robust with respect to F, and we 
should focus instead on trying to avoid F altogether. My 
2 I am indebted here especially to Tollefsen (2015). My tripartite 
distinction between realism, pragmatism, and interpretivism over-
simplifies the vast literature on philosophical method. In particular, 
my ‘pragmatism’ is broader than the specific tradition of James or 
Dewey, and my ‘interpretivism’, while inspired by Strawson’s work 
on “reactive attitudes” and Dennett’s “intentional stance” (Tollefsen 
2015, p. 119 and p. 97, respectively), is not necessarily committed to 
the details of their views.
3 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for pressing me on this 
point.
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task in "Broken Futures" and "Digital Futures" sections is to 
persuade the reader that the accounts of broken and digital 
future ethics developed in those sections do satisfy this third 
criterion.
I conclude that the search for a temporally robust account 
of corporate groups should interest everyone. To determine 
whether currently popular accounts are temporally robust, I 
explore ways that credible futures might transform current 
debates. Future people may see things differently because 
they recognise new moral individuals (such as digital peo-
ple); accept different accounts of people’s rights and respon-
sibilities; regard different features of persons as important; 
favour different interpretations of contested concepts such as 
intentionality or consciousness; have different general philo-
sophical priorities; or face different threats from corporate 
groups.
Any precise prediction about the future is almost certainly 
false. The future of human beliefs and behaviour is espe-
cially difficult to predict. I do not claim to provide a descrip-
tion of what will happen, or even of what is likely to happen. 
But I do present two credible futures whose challenges and 
threats are very real. If one account of corporate groups is 
much better equipped than its rivals to meet those challenges 
and threats, then it has a significant competitive advantage.
Some possible futures are more significant than others. 
If we are risk-averse, or if we give priority to the interests of 
the worst off, then we should pay disproportionate attention 
to futures whose inhabitants are worse off than ourselves, 
even if more optimistic futures are equally likely. We should 
also pay disproportionate attention to scenarios where our 
influence on future people’s moral beliefs might have the 
greatest impact and where corporate groups themselves are 
most threatening.
I examine two possible futures: broken and digital. Each 
represents a wider class of possibilities characterised by 
either extreme scarcity or the emergence of non-moral cor-
porate agents. I ask how people living in those futures might 
re-imagine our debates about corporate groups, and what we 
might learn from their future debates.
The Present Debate About Corporate Agency
Before turning to our two possible futures, I summarise the 
present philosophical debate about corporate groups, focus-
ing on features that might change in the future.
Individualism Versus Collectivism
The debate about corporate agency is structured by a tension 
between two appealing intuitions (Hindriks 2014, p. 1566). 
(1) Some corporate groups are moral actors who should 
be held responsible for their actions—especially when no 
individual(s) can feasibly be held to account. (2) No corpo-
rate group is a natural moral person, and therefore no cor-
porate group deserves all the moral rights enjoyed by human 
persons. As there is no agreed terminology, I stipulate a 
contrast between corporate agency and corporate person-
hood to capture this distinction.
Talk of corporate “agency” and “responsibility” is ambig-
uous. It combines ontological claims about the intentional 
and causal capacities of corporate groups with normative 
claims about their moral status. The ontological claim is 
that some corporate groups are independent agents whose 
beliefs, intentions, and actions cannot be entirely reduced to 
those of their individual members. Independent agents are 
causally responsible for their actions. (The classic example 
is where a committee does X because it believes Y, even 
though none of its members either do X or believe Y. See 
e.g. List and Pettit 2011, Chap. 6.) The normative claim 
is that these corporate groups are also moral agents who 
are morally responsible for their actions, can be expected 
to obey moral norms, enjoy some rights, and can therefore 
be wronged.
We can now distinguish four possible positions.4
1. Individualism. Corporate groups are not agents of any 
kind. The only agents are individuals human beings 
(and perhaps some other animals). All talk of corporate 
agency or personhood is metaphorical. Although we 
hold corporate groups “responsible” for legal or com-
pensatory purposes, corporate groups themselves cannot 
bear genuine moral responsibility. It makes no sense to 
literally blame a corporate group.
2. Minimal collectivism. Some corporate groups are inde-
pendent agents who act in the world, but none are moral 
agents or moral persons.
3. Moderate collectivism. Some corporate groups are moral 
agents, but none are fully fledged moral persons. Corpo-
rate groups enjoy some rights (e.g. property, contract) 
and can be held responsible for their actions. But they 
do not enjoy human rights.
4. Extreme collectivism. Some corporate groups are both 
moral agents and moral persons. They have the same 
moral status as human beings and enjoy analogous 
rights.
Individualists reject our first intuition; extreme collec-
tivists reject the second; while minimal and moderate col-
lectivists seek to reconcile the two intuitions. Collectivism 
allows us to hold corporate groups responsible even when 
no individual is responsible. Individualists, by contrast, must 
4 I borrow the individualism/collectivism distinction from Velasquez 
(2003), p. 38. The minimal/moderate/extreme distinction is my own.
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accept that, if no individual is responsible, then no one is 
responsible (Velasquez 2003 explicitly bites this bullet).
I can find no mainstream theorist who defends extreme 
collectivism.5 Even those who defend corporate “person-
hood” explicitly distance themselves from full moral person-
hood in my sense. (e.g. French 1979; Goodpaster and Mat-
thews 1982; List and Pettit 2011; Hindriks 2014, p. 1567; 
Hess 2013, p. 319.) No one argues, for instance, that corpo-
rate groups should enjoy the right to vote, the right to life, or 
the right not to be owned by other persons6 (Hindriks 2014, 
p. 1576 refers to these rights as “the problematic trio”). 
Minimal collectivism is also not a prominent view. The pri-
mary motivation for treating corporate groups as independ-
ent agents is the desire to hold them morally responsible 
for their actions. By contrast, moderate collectivism has 
many proponents (e.g. French 1979; Copp 2007; List and 
Pettit 2011; Hess 2013, p. 14; Pettit 2014), as does indi-
vidualism (e.g. Narveson 2002; Velasquez 2003; Ashman 
and Winstanley 2007; Bevan and Corvellec 2007; Miller 
and Makela 2005). In this paper, my primary interest is in 
the moral status of corporate groups. I therefore focus on 
the debate between individualism and moderate collectiv-
ism—although extreme collectivism re-emerges in  "Digital 
Futures" section.
Individualists argue that moderate collectivism is an 
unstable position (e.g. Velasquez 2003; Rovane 2014). Once 
we recognise corporate groups as moral agents, we are on 
a slippery slope to recognising their full moral personhood. 
But it would be absurd to treat corporate groups as persons. 
Therefore, we must reject moderate collectivism. Moder-
ate collectivists deny that moral agency inevitably leads to 
moral personhood, while extreme collectivists embrace this 
“slippery slope”.
Defending Moderate Collectivism
Moderate collectivists must defend the moral agency of cor-
porate groups while rejecting full corporate moral person-
hood. They typically proceed as follows:
1. Identify paradigmatic moral persons;
2. List similarities and dissimilarities between paradig-
matic moral persons and corporate groups;
3. Argue that the similarities show that some corporate 
groups are moral agents, who may enjoy property rights 
and contractual rights;
4. Argue that the dissimilarities show that all corporate 
groups are not moral persons and therefore don’t enjoy 
distinctively human rights such as life, liberty, and polit-
ical participation.
All sides agree that our paradigm moral persons are nor-
mally functioning adult human beings who are both moral 
agents and moral persons. They cause things to happen, have 
obligations, can be held responsible for their actions, and 
enjoy both agency rights (e.g. they can own property and 
enter into contracts) and distinctively human rights (e.g. they 
should be entitled to vote, they cannot be enslaved or unlaw-
fully killed, etc.).
Debate persists because we cannot agree either on the 
essential distinctive features of paradigmatic moral persons, 
nor on whether any corporate group shares those features. 
Agency and personhood both involve a web of inter-related 
contested concepts. The following features of human adults 
have been identified as either necessary or sufficient for 
either moral agency or personhood: having a soul (cf. Pettit 
2014, p. 1642, attributing the view to Pope Innocent IV); 
being embodied (Hess 2013); being a biological organism 
(Velasquez 2003; Miller and Makela 2005); being sentient, 
aware, self-aware, conscious, or self-conscious (Ashman and 
Winstanley 2007; Bevan and Corvellec 2007; Hussain and 
Moriarty 2016); being free, autonomous, or self-directed 
(Copp 2007; List and Pettit 2011; Hess 2014); possessing 
intentionality (Ashman and Winstanley 2007; Hindriks 
2014, p. 574; Velasquez 2003; French 1979; List and Pettit 
2011); being rational or responsive to reasons (French 1979; 
Bratman 2000; Pettit 2007, List and Pettit 2011; Hess 2014); 
being moral, responsive to moral reasons, empathetic, or 
other-regarding (Bevan and Corvellec 2007; Velasquez 
2003; List and Pettit 2011).
Moderate collectivists offer stricter conditions for per-
sonhood than for moral agency. For instance, perhaps per-
sonhood demands sentience or consciousness, while inten-
tionality or rationality is sufficient for moral agency (e.g. 
French 1984; List and Pettit 2011; Hindriks 2014, p. 1567; 
List 2016). By contrast, individualists often elide agency 
and personhood, defending similar conditions for both (e.g. 
Velasquez 2003; Ashman and Winstanley 2007; Bevan and 
Corvellec 2007).
Even philosophers who agree on the criteria for agency or 
personhood often disagree on their application to corporate 
groups. Some properties clearly rule out corporate groups. 
Such groups are not embodied biological organisms, nor do 
5 One possible exception is French (1984), although French himself 
adopts a weaker interpretation in his own more recent work. (I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this.)
6 Hasnas (2013) presents an argument that corporations should enjoy 
voting rights. But this argument is explicitly presented as a reductio 
ad absurdum of its premises. (I owe this reference to an anonymous 
reviewer.) Similarly, Kusch argues that it is inconsistent for List and 
Pettit to allow corporations to be enslaved! (Kusch 2014, pp. 1597–
1598).
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they have souls.7 If these things are essential to moral agency 
or personhood, then corporate groups cannot qualify. Collec-
tivists must deny that these features are necessary—arguing 
either that they are incidental to moral agency (e.g. organic 
embodiment), or that human do not possess them and there-
fore they cannot be the basis of our agency (e.g. souls).
All the other items on our list are sites of intense philo-
sophical controversy. Collectivists typically focus on inten-
tionality, rationality, and responsiveness to reasons. They 
defend particular interpretations of these concepts that allow 
for both human and corporate moral agents, while individu-
alists favour interpretations that exclude non-human agents. 
In particular, collectivists favour functionalist views where 
“mental states are to be defined in terms of what they do 
rather than in terms of their physical make-up” (Tollefsen 
2015, p. 69. See also, e.g.; French 1979; List and Pettit 2011; 
Pettit 2014). Agency is an organisational property, not a mat-
ter of having the correct biological substrate. And “if a bio-
logical or vital organism can be functionally organized so 
as to meet the constraints of agency, why can’t an artificial 
entity be organized in that way as well? Why not a suit-
ably engineered robot, for example? And why not a suitably 
organized group of individuals?” (Pettit 2014, p. 1645) [We 
return to robots in "Digital Futures!" section.] By contrast, 
individualists favour phenomenological or organic accounts 
where intentionality demands either conscious awareness 
or specifically human embodiment (e.g. Ashman and Win-
stanley 2007 drawing on Husserl; Bevan and Corvellec 2007 
on Levinas; Velasquez 2003 on the Thomist tradition; and 
Miller and Makela 2005 on “common-sense”).
Both sides typically assume that corporate groups are not 
conscious. They have no experiences of their own, no inner 
goals, no qualia. There is nothing it is like to be a corporate 
group.8 Individualists, who regard consciousness as essen-
tial to any form of agency, conclude that corporate groups 
cannot even be independent agents (let alone moral agents). 
Moderate collectivists reply that, while lack of conscious-
ness is no barrier to moral agency, it does explain why cor-
porate groups are not persons, and therefore cannot enjoy 
distinctively human rights. We can attribute responsibility, 
property, and contract to any moral agent. But life, political 
participation, and freedom from slavery only matter to con-
scious beings.9
Hindriks notes a tension within moderate collectivism at 
this point. If one embraces a functionalist analysis of inten-
tionality, why not endorse an analogous account of con-
sciousness? But then: “If sentience is a functional property, 
it cannot be tied uniquely to a particular kind of matter”. 
(Hindriks 2014, p. 1582) I argue in "Digital Futures" sec-
tion that, for similar reasons, future people may find it much 
harder to deny that corporate groups are conscious.
Responding to Moral Reasons
The final criterion on our list is responsiveness to moral 
reasons. There is broad agreement that, in order to act in the 
world, every moral agent must respond to some reasons: an 
individual or corporate group whose behaviour was random, 
mechanical, or purely instinctual would not be any kind of 
agent. The interesting controversy concerns moral reasons.
To explore the significance of moral reasons, we must 
first introduce two further distinctions. (Cf. List and Pettit 
2011, p. 158.) One is between recognition of moral rea-
sons and appropriate responses to those reasons. The other 
(orthogonal) distinction is between ability and reliability. A 
putative agent might be able to recognise moral reasons, or 
to respond appropriately, without being reliably disposed to 
exercise those abilities.
We can now separate several different moral criteria for 
moral agency or personhood. The least demanding moral 
criterion would only insist on the ability to recognise moral 
reasons. Next, we could insist on the ability to respond 
appropriately. (e.g. List and Pettit 2011, Chap. 7) The most 
demanding moral criterion would require reliably appropri-
ate response.
I will concentrate on the strongest reliability-based cri-
terion, partly because it is both the most interesting and the 
most controversial, but also because it is most likely to come 
to the fore in possible futures. I will refer to collectivists who 
endorse that condition as moralised collectivists. (Moralised 
collectivism can be either extreme or moderate, depending 
on whether morally reliable corporate groups qualify as per-
sons or only as moral agents.)
7 Corporate groups made up of human beings are constituted by bio-
logical organisms. So they are embodied in that sense. But no corpo-
rate group has the organic unity of a single organism. (I am grateful 
to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.)
8 Collectivists who deny the possibility of group consciousness 
include Tuomela (2013), p.  52; Theiner (2014); Tollefsen (2015), 
p. 63; List (2016). Two rare exceptions who do not rule out this possi-
bility are Huebner (2014), p. 120, and Schwitzgebel (2015). Note that 
what is at issue here is phenomenal consciousness. Many collectivists 
argue that corporate groups can enjoy weaker non-experiential alter-
natives such as “access consciousness” or “consciousness as aware-
ness”. (Tollefsen 2015, p. 52; List 2016, p. 6).
9 The growing literature on political CSR (corporate social respon-
sibility) may seem to be an exception, because it argues that corpora-
tions (in particular) should be involved in politics (e.g. Scherer and 
Palazzo 2011). However, that literature addresses the distinct ques-
tion of how corporations should contribute to political institutions 
designed to further the interests of individuals, rather than asking 
whether corporations possess a moral right to participate in politi-
cal decision-making to further their own interests. (Here I follow the 
critique in Hussain and Moriarty (2016). I owe this reference to an 
anonymous reviewer.)
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Moral conditions are often introduced in response to the 
problem of psychopathic (or otherwise morally unreliable) 
corporate groups. Normally functioning human adults rec-
ognise, and respond to, moral reasons. They accept that the 
interests of others constrain their pursuit of their own goals. 
But some human adults cannot recognise moral reasons or 
other-regarding constraints. At the risk of over-simplifica-
tion, let us call such people “psychopaths”. (On the broader 
philosophical significance of psychopathy, see e.g. Malatesti 
2010.) A familiar theme in the recent literature is that many 
actual corporate groups—and especially for-profit business 
enterprises—are closer to psychopaths than to normally 
functioning human adults (e.g. Bakan 2004, p. 56ff). They 
can act, intend, plan, and display instrumental rationality. 
But they feel no empathy, cannot recognise the moral impor-
tance of others’ points of view, and cannot recognise (and 
therefore cannot respond appropriately to) moral reasons. 
Indeed, psychopathic behaviour is encouraged by modern 
theories of the firm that insist business enterprises should 
single-mindedly maximise returns to shareholders! (Nor 
is legal incorporation any barrier to psychopathy, because 
modern corporations can pursue any legal purpose.)
No one denies that human psychopaths are independ-
ent agents who act in the world. Moralised collectivism 
is thus not a viable option for the minimal collectivist. If 
non-psychopathic corporate groups are independent agents, 
then so are psychopathic ones. But if the ability to recognise 
moral reasons is an essential feature of moral agency, then 
psychopathic corporate groups are not moral agents. The 
most minimal moral condition would rule out psychopaths. 
But we need stronger reliability-based criteria to address 
the threat posed by all corporate groups that (for whatever 
reason) are not reliably disposed to respond appropriately 
to moral reasons. Psychopathic corporate groups are merely 
one striking subset.
Individualists will reply that the best defence against any 
abuse of corporate power is to insist that all talk of “cor-
porate action” is merely a convenient short-hand, that no 
corporate group has any agency over-and-above the agency 
of its members, that corporate groups don’t really have any 
rights, and that individuals should never be allowed to evade 
responsibility by shifting it onto corporate groups. Moralised 
collectivists will object that this solution is not temporally 
robust. As corporate groups become more sophisticated and 
ubiquitous, it will become increasing impossible to insist 
that no corporate group is a moral agent. Our only hope is to 
draw a principled distinction between morally reliable cor-
porate groups and unreliable ones, and then prevent unscru-
pulous individuals from shifting responsibility onto the latter 
by denying that morally unreliable agents are moral agents 
at all.
Moralised collectivism is a minority position in the 
present debate. But it is endorsed or suggested by some 
moderate collectivists. (Cf. List and Pettit 2011, p. 159; 
Hess 2013; Tollefsen 2015, Chap. 6.) I shall argue that, in 
the future, this minority position will become much more 
prominent. Indeed, I will argue that moralised collectivism 
is the only temporally robust position.
The Interpersonal Dimension
These differences between individualists and collectivists 
are relatively clear-cut. The next point of difference is harder 
to pin down in particular cases. But it seems to me to play 
a key role in the dialectic between the two camps. This new 
disagreement is not about a specific criterion. Rather, it 
affects the interpretation of several independent criteria.10
Collectivists place a much greater emphasis on the inter-
personal dimension of agency. This is partly a matter of 
different starting points. Collectivists focus on how we rec-
ognise one another as agents. Any acceptable criterion of 
agency must be publically assessable, and therefore criteria 
based on inner mental states are prima facie inferior to those 
based on observable interpersonal behaviour. By contrast, 
individualists start from each individual’s experience of her 
own moral personhood. They are therefore innately suspi-
cious of public interpersonal criteria precisely because they 
could come apart from the agent’s private inner states.
This difference in starting points tracks a deeper disagree-
ment. Collectivists often favour conceptions of intentionality 
or rationality that make these contested concepts intrinsi-
cally interpersonal. The ability to interact successfully with 
others, and to make oneself understood by them, is an essen-
tial feature of either independent agency or moral agency. 
(The clearest example is Philip Pettit, whose accounts of cor-
porate agency in Pettit 2007, 2014; List and Pettit 2011 build 
on the interpersonal account of the capacity for thought and 
concept possession set out in Pettit 1993.) Individualists’ 
lists of essential features are typically more self-contained, 
as are their interpretations of contested concepts such as 
intentionality or rationality. A socially isolated human agent 
could still possess a soul, be an embodied animal, or be 
conscious.
For our purposes in this paper, these disputes about inter-
personal relations matter for two reasons. First, the collectiv-
ist shift from unverifiable inner states such as consciousness 
to observable interpersonal interactions makes it easier for 
corporate groups to be publically recognised as moral agents 
10 This section explores general tendencies, not universal differences. 
I do not claim that every collectivist emphasises the interpersonal 
dimension of agency more than every individualist. I claim instead 
only that, in general, collectivists give this dimension greater weight 
than individualists. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
pressing me on this point.)
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especially if it is in their own interest to be so recognised.11 
Second, I argue below that the interpersonal dimension 
itself becomes more important in some significant possi-
ble futures. Because collectivism already emphasises that 
dimension, it thus enjoys a comparative advantage in those 
futures.
Three Philosophical Methods
Disagreement about the significance of interpersonal inter-
actions shades into a broader disagreement about philosophi-
cal methodology. As I outlined in "Why Should We Think 
About Possible Futures?" section, philosophical accounts 
of corporate moral agency and personhood can be realist, 
pragmatist, or interpretivist.
For the realist, the philosopher’s primary task is to deter-
mine the (metaphysical) facts (e.g. Velasquez 1983, 2003). 
Normative questions arise only after the metaphysical facts 
are settled, with the moral status of corporate groups deter-
mined by their metaphysical nature. If morally unreliable 
corporate groups meet the necessary conditions for moral 
agency, then we should acknowledge the fact that they are 
moral agents. Conversely, if no corporate group (not even 
a morally reliable one) satisfies those conditions, then we 
should acknowledge that as a matter of fact there are no 
corporate moral agents.
The pragmatist, by contrast, insists that both metaphysi-
cal and normative questions are settled soley by reference to 
our interests (e.g. Ashman and Winstanley 2007; Donaldson 
1982; Dubbink and Smith 2011; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; 
Werhane 1985. For critique, see Hasnas 2013). We should 
acknowledge corporate groups as independent and/or moral 
agents, recognise their rights, hold them to account, and so 
on, if and only if doing these things best promotes what 
matters to us.
Some philosophers combine realism and pragmatism, 
often reserving the latter for questions about moral status. 
List and Pettit’s moralised collectivism nicely illustrates 
this possibility (List and Pettit 2011, Chap. 7). While their 
account of independent agency can be interpreted as real-
ist (or interpretivist), their moral condition is clearly prag-
matist. They argue that we should restrict moral agency 
to corporate groups that are morally reliable, not because 
this tracks some underlying metaphysical reality, but rather 
because it best serves the practical purpose of advancing 
the interests of human individuals. List and Pettit adopt 
“a normatively individualist framework … that treats only 
individual people … as ultimate units of moral significance, 
while assigning only derivative moral significance to [cor-
porate groups]”. (List 2016, pp. 20–21) They also take a 
broadly consequentialist approach—seeking rules governing 
collective moral agency that will maximise human welfare 
into the future.
We now confront another potential ambiguity within 
collectivism. To recognise another’s moral agency or per-
sonhood can mean either to acknowledge that the other is 
(independent of one’s recognition) a moral agent or person, 
or to decide to treat the other as a bearer of certain moral 
rights and duties. Realists typically use ‘recognise’ in the 
first sense, while pragmatists have in mind the second sense. 
In what follows, to remain neutral between realism and prag-
matism, I typically speak generically of recognising moral 
agency or personhood. But it should always be remembered 
that realists and pragmatists will interpret this recognition 
in quite different ways.
The interpretivist takes an intermediate position (e.g. 
Tollefsen 2015. For critique, see Huebner 2014). Like the 
realist, she seeks to describe not prescribe. But her descrip-
tions are internal to our social practices. The interpretivist 
asks whether individualism or collectivism offers the bet-
ter interpretation of our practice of ascribing moral agency 
and moral responsibility to both individuals and corporate 
groups. We should embrace whatever account of corporate 
groups best fits that practice. Realism and pragmatism both 
take seriously the possibility that our current practices could 
be radically deficient—either because they fail to reliably 
track metaphysical reality or because some feasible alter-
native would better serve our practical goals. By contrast, 
the interpretivist takes our current practice as given. There 
is no external standard, and an existing practice can only 
be judged to be deficient according to standards internal to 
itself.
Logically speaking, these methodological (realist vs. 
pragmatist vs. interpretivist) and substantive (individual-
ist vs. collectivist) divisions are orthogonal. Realists could 
endorse either individualism or collectivism, as could prag-
matists and interpretivists. And most individualists and col-
lectivists offer a variety of realist, pragmatist, and interpre-
tivist arguments for their respective substantive positions. 
However, there are some notable correlations between sub-
stance and method. Individualists are more likely to empha-
sise realist arguments, while collectivists are more likely to 
offer pragmatist or interpretivist ones. In particular, individ-
ualists often insist, on metaphysical grounds, that it simply 
makes no sense to say that corporate groups are agents of 
any kind; while moderate collectivists focus on the (nega-
tive) practical implications of denying that corporate groups 
are moral agents.
11 While interpersonal interactions within a corporate group can be 
hidden from public view, they are at least observable in principle—
unlike individual phenomenological states. Corporate groups there-
fore can lay their inner workings open to outside inspection if they 
have sufficient incentive to do so. Other agents can then ensure trans-
parency by providing such incentives. (I am grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for pressing me on this point.)
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Present philosophers’ views about corporate groups 
depend on their prior views about human moral agency and 
personhood, and on their philosophical priorities. Future 
people may see things differently because they recognise 
new paradigmatic moral people; accept different accounts 
of their rights and responsibilities; regard different features 
of persons as important; favour different interpretations of 
contested concepts such as intentionality or consciousness; 
have different general philosophical priorities; or face differ-
ent threats from corporate groups. For instance, in a digital 
future where both adult humans and digital being are para-
digm moral persons, credible criteria for moral agency or 
personhood must cover persons of both kinds.
We now turn, finally, to our exploration of broken and 
digital futures. Over the next two sections, I defend two gen-
eral conclusions: reflection on future ethics offers us new 
resources to defend ourselves against morally unreliable 
corporate groups, and the only temporally robust position is 
moralised extreme collectivism. I also argue that the future 
of ethics is path dependent. How people think in the dis-
tant future will be influenced by the particular ethical tools 
they inherit from intermediate futures. In particular, digital 
futures look very different when approached from the stand-
point of an already broken world.
Broken Futures
Imagine a future broken by climate change, where a cha-
otic climate makes life precarious, Rawlsian “favourable 
conditions” (Rawls 1971, p. 178) no longer apply (i.e. it is 
no longer possible to meet all basic needs and respect all 
basic liberties), and our affluent way of life is no longer an 
option. This is one credible future. No one can reasonably be 
confident it won’t happen. It involves no outlandish claims, 
scientific impossibilities, or implausible expectations about 
human behaviour. Climate change—or some other disaster—
might produce a broken future.
To make our discussion more concrete, I also assume 
that the broken future results primarily from anthropogenic 
climate change to which the wealthiest individuals, nations, 
and corporate groups have disproportionately contributed. 
The inclusion of corporate groups is not ad hoc. While 
discussion of differential responsibility for anthropogenic 
climate change typically focuses on the causal and moral 
responsibilities of wealthier individuals and/or nations, there 
is considerable evidence that the world’s most powerful 
corporate groups are also casually implicated. For instance, 
Heede (2014) argues that 63% of all emissions of  CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases between 1751 and 2010 can be traced 
to 90 international entities (investor-owned companies, state-
owned enterprises, or current and former centrally planned 
states), while the ten largest investor-owned companies 
alone contributed 15.8%. Heede himself concludes that this 
analysis “suggests a somewhat different, and perhaps useful 
way to consider responsibility for climate change” (Heede 
2014, p. 235). In addition to their direct emissions, some 
corporate groups also indirectly exacerbate climate change 
by undermining legislative proposals to curb green house 
gas emissions—via lobbying, promoting misinformation and 
uncertainty, or funding candidates, individuals, and organi-
sations who are “sceptical” about climate change (Arnold 
2016; Oreskes and Conway 2010). In the United States, in 
particular, Arnold argues that “a major cause of this failure 
[to enact legislation to curb green house gas emissions] has 
been corporate political activity intended to defeat such leg-
islative efforts” (Arnold 2016, p. 233).
The threat of a broken future forces us to take our obliga-
tions to future people more seriously. People living in such 
a future must also rethink their basic ethical commitments. 
In this section, I argue that the moral resources of the broken 
future are also essential components of our best response to 
the threat of morally unreliable corporate groups.
Ethics in Broken Futures
Drawing on my own earlier work  (Mulgan 2011, 2014, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2018),  I now 
briefly sketch five key ways that the ethical outlook of a 
broken future society might differ from our own.
Rethinking Rights in an Age of Scarcity
In a broken future, scarcity of material resources (especially 
water) and an unpredictable climate create periodic popu-
lation bottlenecks where not everyone can survive. (This 
is what the loss of Rawlsian favourable conditions means.) 
When nothing (not even bare survival) can be guaranteed 
to everyone, rights must either be abandoned or radically 
reinvented. Social survival in a broken world may require 
restrictions on personal liberty on a scale that people have 
only previously accepted in times of war or other tempo-
rary crisis. Private land and individual labour might be req-
uisitioned to grow food; the use of fossil fuels for private 
purposes might be severely curtailed; and individual life-
style choices—especially reproductive decisions—might be 
much more tightly regulated and constrained than we would 
accept. Our affluent liberal ethics, designed for a world of 
enduring favourable conditions and emphasising individual 
rights, is thus particularly ill-suited to a broken world. This 
is why the broken world is so ethically unsettling.
Abandoning Historical Entitlements
My broken future is disproportionately caused by the wealth-
iest individuals, nations, and corporate groups. Even if they 
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inherited legitimate property rights, morally responsible 
future individuals, nations, and corporate groups would be 
overwhelmed by an obligation to assist people whose plight 
is a direct consequence of the actions of their forebears or 
even (for intergenerational nations or corporate groups) their 
own past actions. No one in a broken world who inherited 
property holdings could use them entirely as they wished.
From Natural Rights to Consequentialism
Most natural rights theorists concede that present prop-
erty rights are only justified if they benefit (or at least do 
not harm) future people. (For instance, many libertarians 
enshrine this commitment in Lockean provisos.) In our afflu-
ent world, this future-directed constraint lies in the back-
ground, because philosophers routinely take it for granted 
that future people will be better-off than present people. In 
a broken future, by contrast, it will move centre-stage. This 
has both practical and theoretical consequences. Practically, 
future philosophers will deny that our property rights were 
ever legitimate, because our exercise of those rights has left 
our descendants worse off due to climate change. They will 
therefore deny that individuals or corporate groups in their 
broken world could possibly have inherited any property 
rights from our affluent world. Theoretically, future phi-
losophers will also reject natural rights theories that present 
rights as absolute side-constraints. They will instead favour 
forward-looking consequentialist accounts where rights are 
justified by future benefits and constrained by changing cir-
cumstances. At the very least, future philosophers will be 
much more sympathetic to consequentialism, and more sus-
picious of natural rights, than contemporary philosophers.
The Urgency of Cooperation
In a broken world, collective survival demands social coop-
eration on an unprecedented scale. Broken world thinkers 
will attach much greater significance to the ability to recog-
nise, respect, and safeguard the long-term collective interests 
of human beings. Nurturing and developing this ability will 
be the central task of moral education and public institu-
tions. This positive emphasis also has a negative flip-side. 
In a world where every inefficiency results in unnecessary 
deaths or increased risks of social collapse, and where the 
rights to life, liberty, and reproductive freedom of morally 
reliable persons are severely curtailed, the rights of unreli-
able human beings may be restricted even further. In our 
affluent liberal societies, we can afford to be tolerant, within 
limits, of psychopaths, refuseniks, and other unreliable indi-
viduals. Broken world dwellers, who regard such people as 
threats to the very existence of society, will be much more 
wary. Broken world society will therefore be both (a) much 
less permissive regarding reproductive, childrearing or other 
choices that could result in the emergence of morally unreli-
able individuals; and also (b) less tolerant of such individu-
als once they emerge.
The Changing Role of Philosophy
For several reasons, broken world philosophers will be more 
likely than present philosophers to prioritise pragmatism 
over realism. All broken world inhabitants make sacrifices 
for the common good more readily than we do. (Evidence 
from earlier eras when people often lived in less abundant 
circumstances strongly suggests that greater self-sacrifice is 
possible. And a broken world society—one whose founda-
tions are not xenophobic or otherwise ethically unaccepta-
ble—is impossible without it!) Given their own grim history, 
future philosophers will also take their own intergenerational 
obligations much more seriously than we do, and place 
greater importance on collective and intergenerational pro-
jects. Philosophers are people too. In a broken world, where 
the stakes are always higher, philosophers will feel more 
pressure (from both internal and external sanctions) to con-
sider the long-term real-world consequences of competing 
philosophical positions. This change in priorities reinforces 
the other distinctive features of broken world ethics—espe-
cially the focus on cooperation rather than self-reliance, 
the downgrading of individual rights, and the upgrading of 
forward-looking consequentialism.
Corporate Groups in Broken Futures
Two factors will influence broken world thinking about cor-
porate groups. On the one hand, corporate groups will loom 
even larger in the broken world than in our affluent present. 
Because it demands unprecedented sacrifices for the com-
mon good, social survival in a broken world needs a stronger 
sense of collective solidarity than anything that exists in any 
contemporary Western society. Any broken future society 
will give a prominent role to corporate groups that fairly dis-
tribute scarce resources, allocate responsibilities, represent 
the interests of future people, and enforce entitlements. On 
the other hand, broken world philosophers will also be more 
concerned than us about the long-term threat posed by mor-
ally unreliable corporate groups—especially as they will be 
aware of the damage done to their world by the psychopathic 
business enterprises of our own age!
Being more inclined to pragmatism than present philoso-
phers, broken world philosophers will be especially anxious 
to reduce the threat posed by morally unreliable corporate 
groups, without abandoning corporate groups altogether. 
How might they approach this task?
One option is to embrace individualism, and deny that 
any corporate group is an agent of any kind. Unfortunately, 
all the distinctive features of broken world philosophy count 
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very strongly against individualism. I argued in "Ethics 
in Broken Futures" section that broken world philosophy 
emphasises interpersonal cooperation and moral reliabil-
ity, replaces backward-looking natural rights theory with 
forward-looking consequentialism, down-plays the signifi-
cance of individual entitlements and self-reliance, and is 
more pragmatist than contemporary philosophy. This com-
bination of factors strongly suggests that broken world crite-
ria for agency and personhood will emphasise interpersonal 
interaction, publically assessable behaviour, and long-term 
consequences rather than the individual’s private mental 
states and/or intrinsic biological or metaphysical properties.
This change in emphasis has two salient implications. 
Most obviously, we can expect a downgrading of precisely 
those criteria that corporate groups cannot possibly meet, 
such as ensoulment or embodiment. While some broken 
world philosophers will no doubt continue to regard con-
sciousness, embodiment, or even ensoulment as important 
features of human agents, the increased emphasis on other 
criteria will diminish the comparative importance of these 
individualist-friendly features—both for individual philoso-
phers and within the philosophical community as a whole.
More subtly, when they turn to contested concepts such 
as intentionality or rationality, broken world philosophers 
will favour interpretations that emphasise public behaviour 
and interpersonal interaction over private states or biological 
factors. In particular, they will prefer functionalist interpre-
tations where “mental states are to be defined in terms of 
what they do rather than in terms of their physical make-up” 
(Tollefsen 2015, p. 69). As I argued in "Defending Moderate 
Collectivism" section, these are precisely the interpretations 
of contested concepts that are most favourable to corporate 
groups.
These theoretical considerations will make individualism 
less appealing to all broken future philosophers. Realists 
will reject individualism because it doesn’t meet the criteria 
they regard as essential for metaphysical truth; interpretiv-
ists because it doesn’t respect broken world practices that 
employ those criteria; and pragmatists because its lack of 
credibility means that individualism cannot provide a useful 
defence against the threat of morally unreliable corporate 
groups.
Broken world philosophers will favour collectivism over 
individualism. They will also favour moralised collectiv-
ism—recognising as moral agents only those corporate 
groups that reliably respond appropriately to moral reasons. 
There are several reasons for this. I argued in "Ethics in Bro-
ken Futures" section that broken world ethics is less toler-
ant of morally unreliable individuals than our contemporary 
affluent ethics. Morally unreliable corporate groups will be 
tolerated even less. No stable society could possibly persist 
unless normal patterns of moral development ensure that 
most human adults do recognise moral reasons and reliably 
respond appropriately. Any functioning moral code includes 
a presumption of moral reliability that treats human adults 
as innocent until they prove themselves guilty. (And proven 
psychopathic or morally unreliable humans cannot simply be 
ignored or destroyed without considerable moral cost—even 
in the harsh world of the broken future.) By contrast, if a 
corporate group’s constitution allows it to pursue any legal 
purpose, while its management structure lacks any mecha-
nism for recognising and then responding appropriately to 
moral reasons, then it is irredeemably psychopathic. (And a 
psychopathic corporate group, unlike its human equivalent, 
has no moral standing at all.) In a fragile world of extreme 
scarcity, anyone wishing to create a new corporate group—
and have it recognised by others—must first demonstrate that 
it will be morally reliable.
Broken future pragmatists have an additional reason to 
favour moralised collectivism. In a world where personal 
liberty and privacy are generally more circumscribed, it 
will be much harder (thanks to both public institutions and 
social mores) to create a new corporate group without public 
scrutiny of its moral reliability. Like the creation of a new 
human being, creating a new corporate group will not be 
seen as a self-regarding private act! Moralised collectivism 
thus promises better protection against the emergence of 
morally unreliable corporate groups in a broken future than 
it does in our unbroken present. While individualism and 
non-moralised collectivism fare worse in the broken future, 
moralised collectivism fares better, especially by the prag-
matist standards that future philosophers will privilege.
I conclude that, relative to our current debate, broken 
world philosophers will be more critical of both individual-
ism and non-moralised collectivism, and more favourable 
towards moralised collectivism. We can expect that mor-
alised collectivism to remain moderate. The transition to a 
broken world will not undermine the natural human reluc-
tance to grant distinctively human rights to corporate groups. 
Indeed, the known consequences of granting such rights to 
some corporate groups in the past will be a stark warning! 
Extreme collectivism is likely to remain a minority posi-
tion. However, as we shall see in "Digital Futures" section, 
the broken world could lead to other possible futures where 
even moderate collectivism becomes untenable and extreme 
collectivism is the only credible option.
Embracing Broken Future Ethics
I have argued that future philosophers will favour moralised 
collectivism over both individualism and non-moralised col-
lectivism. If we seek a temporally robust account of corpo-
rate groups, this gives us now a reason to look more favoura-
bly on moralised collectivism. This reason is obviously most 
relevant to philosophers who endorse both consequentialism 
and pragmatism, because they already seek the account of 
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corporate groups that promises the best consequences into 
the distant future. But, as I argued in "Why Should We Think 
About Possible Futures?" section, anyone who cares about 
the future has some reason to embrace the ethical outlook 
of the broken future.
I would also argue that, whatever their starting-point, 
reflection on my broken future should make all philosophers 
more sympathetic to both pragmatism and consequential-
ism. My broken future reminds us that our present actions 
may have a very significant—and very negative—impact on 
future people who are worse off than ourselves. And the pos-
sible negative future impact of present-day corporate groups 
reminds us that ideas about corporate agency and respon-
sibility are not harmless objects of philosophical specula-
tion. Indeed, if we think of the resources of our world in 
intergenerational terms, then perhaps our world is already 
broken—the resources of the earth may already be too dam-
aged to meet the basic needs of everyone who will live in the 
future. Perhaps the pragmatist consequentialist ethic of the 
broken future should become our ethic too.
Digital Futures
Imagine a digital future where flesh-and-blood humans 
have been replaced by digital beings—intelligent machines 
and/or digital copies of human brains (e.g. Blackford and 
Broderick 2014; Bostrom 2014; Chalmers 2010; Hauskel-
ler 2013, p. 115–132; Mulgan 2014, 2016b, 2018). This is 
another credible future. No one can reasonably be confident 
it won’t happen. We should be wary of breathless predic-
tions of the imminent rise of super-intelligent machines 
(see, e.g. the critique presented in Floridi 2014). But confi-
dent pronouncements that artificial intelligence and digital 
uploading will forever remain engineering impossibilities 
are equally suspect. Computers continually confound their 
critics by performing tasks long deemed “impossible” (“No 
computer will ever play Checkers, or Chess, or Go; drive a 
car; recognise a face”, etc.)
Digital futures could be especially appealing to people 
whose “real-world” alternative is already broken. A broken 
world might possess sufficient resources to upload, store, 
and “run” billions of minds, but not to maintain a compara-
ble number of human beings. At the extreme, perhaps only 
digital beings can survive some catastrophe that will be fatal 
for all biological humans. The digital future would then be 
the only possible inhabited future.
The digital future introduces the threat of an inhuman 
corporate future, where there is no human participation in 
the dominant corporate groups at all. Every worker, man-
ager, contractor, customer, board member, voter, regulator, 
office-holder, or share-holder is a digital being. If digital 
futures are credible, then so too are inhuman corporate 
ones. As their own numbers and processing speeds increase, 
digital beings can create new corporate groups at an ever-
increasing rate.
The threat of morally unreliable corporate groups thus 
arises in the digital future in a very acute form. Any tem-
porally robust account of corporate groups must cope with 
such futures. Unfortunately, the digital future is also espe-
cially destabilising for our present thinking about corporate 
groups—largely because it introduces new paradigm moral 
persons, namely digital persons.
Philosophical debate about digital beings mirrors the 
debate about corporate groups. We have four analogous sub-
stantive positions: exclusivism (only biological humans can 
be agents or persons), minimal inclusivism (digital beings 
can be independent agents but not moral agents or persons), 
moderate inclusivism (digital beings can be moral agents but 
not persons), and extreme inclusivism (digital beings can be 
full moral persons with human rights and morally significant 
interests). And we have the same three philosophical method-
ologies: realist, pragmatist, and interpretivist. Are we trying 
to discover the metaphysical truth about digital beings, decide 
how best to deal with them, or interpret an existing practice?
At present, digital beings are imaginary. Philosophical 
discussion is therefore predominantly realist. Most pragma-
tists are not (yet) worried about digital beings, and there is 
no extant ‘practice regarding digital beings’ to interpret. By 
contrast, in a future where digital beings are common-place, 
pragmatism and interpretivism will come to the fore. And 
they will both favour extreme inclusivism. Pragmatically, it 
will make little sense to deny the personhood of beings who 
are indistinguishable for all practical purposes from flesh-
and-blood humans. And we can imagine a digital interpre-
tivist paraphrasing Tollefsen’s defence of collectivism about 
corporate groups: “I think it is clear that our lives would 
be greatly impoverished by relinquishing the reactive atti-
tudes toward [digital beings]. … Eliminating our emotional 
responses to [digital beings] would eliminate the possibility 
of relationships with [digital beings] and relationships of 
this sort are a substantial part of society. Indeed, many of our 
relationships with [human] individuals seem to be depend-
ent upon … relationships with [digital beings]”. (Tollefsen 
2003, pp. 229–230).
A future where some digital beings are recognised as full 
moral persons alongside adult human beings is definitely 
epistemically possible. No one can be confident it will not 
happen. This future is also especially troubling. Any tempo-
rally robust account of corporate groups must cope with it. 
I therefore stipulate that, in my digital future, digital beings 
are recognised as moral persons.12
12 By insisting that a future where digital beings successfully match 
the cognitive achievements of human beings is even possible, don’t I 
simply beg the question against philosophers such as John Searle who 
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In this section, I first explore the impact within digital 
future ethics of the recognition of digital persons ("Ethics 
in Digital Futures"), before asking how digital future people 
might think about corporate groups ("Corporate Groups in 
Digital Futures"), and finally asking how we should respond 
to digital future ethics ("Should We Adopt the Ethics of This 
Digital Future?").
Ethics in Digital Futures
Extending the ethical domain to include digital persons 
alongside human persons raises many fascinating chal-
lenges (Bostrom 2014; Hanson 2016; Mulgan 2014, 2016b, 
2018; Yudkowsky 2008). I focus here on two factors that are 
directly relevant to our present inquiry.
First, and most obvious, digital future ethics must endorse 
inclusive criteria for agency and personhood. If our para-
digm moral persons include both adult humans and digital 
persons, then our criteria for both moral agency and person-
hood must cover both groups. Philosophers immersed in a 
digital future will regard criteria tailored to human embodi-
ment or physical individuality as obsolete and anthropo-
centric—no better than long-discredited criteria based on 
race, gender, or class. (After all, some future philosophers 
will probably be digital persons!) Future philosophers who 
recognise digital personhood will either agree that digital 
beings are intentional, rational, conscious, and free, or else 
they will deny that these features are truly essential for either 
moral agency or personhood. And for those features that 
they judge to be essential, they will insist on interpretations 
that accommodate digital persons. They will thus reject bio-
logical interpretations that emphasise our particular organic 
substrate in favour of non-biological functional interpreta-
tions where what matters is what someone does, not what 
they are made of.
The second distinctive feature of digital ethics is more 
surprising. Every digital future shares many distinctive fea-
tures of the broken future. In the first place, any digital future 
threatens to descend into a particularly unpleasant broken 
future where resources are insufficient to support all exist-
ing digital beings and the price of labour falls far below 
the cost of keeping any (flesh-and-blood) human labourer 
alive. This is due to the threat of a digital population explo-
sion. Unlike human beings, whose reproduction is limited 
by biology, natural resources, and inclination, digital beings 
can reproduce at will. And they may have strong incentives 
to do so. For instance, Robin Hanson speculates that, in a 
competitive market, “emulations’” based on a few thou-
sand “exceptional” humans could both dominate the digital 
economy and effortlessly outcompete human labour—per-
haps by selling short-lived copies that do a full day’s work 
and then expire without enjoying any leisure time (Hanson 
2016). Flesh-and-blood humans would be overwhelmed by 
a population explosion that, from their (comparatively slow) 
human perspective, would seem more or less instantaneous 
(Bostrom 2014, pp. 22–51).
Like human beings and corporate groups, digital 
beings could be psychopathic or otherwise morally unre-
liable. Indeed, this is quite likely, for several reasons: it 
may be much easier to engineer artificial agents who don’t 
respond to moral reasons than ones who do (Bostrom 2014, 
pp. 105–114); psychopathic or morally unreliable humans 
may be more likely to have both the resources and the incli-
nation to upload and multiply themselves; and the uploading 
process itself might undermine a person’s concern for her 
fellow humans (along with her sanity).
The twin threats of digital population explosion and mor-
ally unreliable digital beings exacerbate one another. If digi-
tal reproduction is constrained only by internalised moral 
norms, then a single morally unreliable digital being could 
very quickly dominate a law-abiding population!
Any stable future digital society must therefore find ways 
to prevent the emergence and/or proliferation of morally 
unreliable digital agents, without eliminating digital persons 
altogether. This task raises much-discussed practical diffi-
culties (e.g. Bostrom 2014, Chap. 9; Chalmers 2010; Yud-
kowsky 2008). However, I set these aside here and assume 
that future people will successfully eliminate (or neutralise) 
morally unreliable digital beings. This daunting task will be 
much easier in an already broken future where regulation 
is more widespread, privacy is reduced, essential resources 
are scarcer, collective scrutiny is the norm, and techniques 
for reliably predicting, influencing, or controlling human 
motivations are more reliable than anything available today.
Any digital future that escapes a digital population explo-
sion is therefore a place where digital reproduction is very 
tightly constrained by both external sanctions and inter-
nalised moral norms. And those sanctions and norms must 
constrain all human persons as well as digital ones. (A sin-
gle rogue human could quickly produce a vast number of 
morally unreliable digital beings.) Any digital society that 
endures for any length of time will restrict the rights and 
freedoms of all persons to a greater degree than any con-
temporary affluent liberal society. In the digital future, no 
one enjoys the right to create new agents who are not mor-
ally reliable. Morally reliable digital beings themselves will 
endorse this constraint, because morally unreliable digital 
Footnote 12 (continued)
regard digital intelligence as a metaphysical impossibility (e.g. Searle 
1982, 1997)? I would argue not. I need only claim that my digital 
future is epistemically possible, not that it is metaphysically possible. 
And it clearly is epistemically possible, precisely because no one can 
be sure that Searle is not wrong! I return to related issues in "Should 
We Adopt the Ethics of This Digital Future?" section.
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beings threaten other digital persons as well as flesh-and-
blood humans.
Many distinctive features of broken world ethics thus re-
emerge in every digital world, even one that didn’t initially 
emerge from an already broken future. Freedom is tightly 
constrained, essential resources are (potentially) extremely 
scarce, individual self-interest is trumped by collective secu-
rity and survival, and so on.
The brokenness of the digital future is important for two 
reasons. First, it raises the importance of broken future eth-
ics, by demonstrating that the set of broken possible futures 
is much larger than it seems. (We should think of the digital 
future as an instance of the broken future rather than an 
alternative to it!) Second, and more optimistically, future 
digital philosophers can help themselves to the ethical les-
sons and resources of the broken future, especially in their 
dealings with corporate groups.
Corporate Groups in Digital Futures
A central challenge for digital future ethics is to prevent the 
emergence and proliferation of morally unreliable corpo-
rate groups, especially those whose members are themselves 
digital beings. How might this be achieved?
If every digital future is also a broken one, then digital 
future philosophers can borrow all the arguments of "Broken 
Futures" section. Individualism and non-moralised collectiv-
ism are thus already on the back foot. I shall now argue that 
there are additional reasons why individualism is not ten-
able in a digital future, and why non-moralised collectivism 
could be disastrous. Only moralised collectivism can meet 
the threat of the inhuman corporate future.
Digital beings are not corporate groups. However, once 
digital persons are recognised, then corporate moral agency 
is much harder to deny. The hardest criteria for corporate 
groups to satisfy are also those that are least friendly to 
digital beings—such as embodiment or ensoulment. Fur-
thermore, I argued in "Ethics in Digital Futures" section 
that interpretations of intentionality and rationality based on 
functional roles are friendlier to digital persons than inter-
pretations based on features peculiar to organic humans. And 
we saw in "Defending Moderate Collectivism" section that 
the former are also the interpretations that are friendlier to 
corporate groups! If future philosophers endorse criteria 
that include digital persons rather than ones moulded to the 
distinctive features of human persons, then they are much 
more likely to also recognise the moral agency of corporate 
groups.
Indeed, in the current debate about corporate groups, 
philosophers on both sides often use robots or computers 
as an analogy—either arguing that corporate groups should 
count as moral agents because robots would, or that nei-
ther should count. (Hess 2014; Pettit 2014, p. 1645; Rovane 
2014, p. 1670; Velasquez 2003) In a real world populated 
by digital beings, the latter option is likely to be untenable.
Velasquez (2003) is a very good case in point. His 
defence of individualism explicitly cites John Searle’s 
account of consciousness as an emergent feature specific to 
human biological embodiment. And Searle himself uses that 
account to deny that artificial intelligences could possibly 
possess consciousness, understanding, or agency (e.g. Searle 
1982, 1997). Philosophers in my digital future will dismiss 
Searle’s position as simple anti-digital prejudice.
I conclude that digital future philosophers will look much 
less favourably on individualism than contemporary philoso-
phers. Having rejected individualism, future philosophers 
will almost certainly also go beyond moderate collectivism. 
In my digital future, some digital beings are recognised, not 
merely as agents, but also as full moral persons. This opens 
the door to analogous extremism about corporate groups. If 
there is a significant boundary between moral agency and 
personhood, there will inevitably be digital beings on both 
sides of that boundary. The most intricate and sophisticated 
corporate groups will then claim recognition as moral per-
sons alongside similarly complex digital beings.
In our unbroken non-digital present, individualists present 
the slide from moderate collectivism to extreme collectivism 
as an argument against collectivism. In a digital future, col-
lectivists will embrace that slippery slope. Perhaps extreme 
collectivism will become the default position!
If future philosophers embrace extreme collectivism, 
then they will have to recognise some corporate groups as 
moral persons whose interests must be counted alongside 
those of biological humans and digital persons. (Extreme 
collectivists thus cannot be normative individualists in List 
and Pettit’s sense.) This raises the worry that digital and 
corporate interests will swamp human ones. One response is 
to insist on individualism and strive to ensure that corporate 
groups are never recognised as persons with morally signifi-
cant interests. I have argued in this section that this response 
is not temporally robust, because it cannot withstand the 
social pressures that are likely to emerge in possible futures 
containing digital persons. A more robust solution would 
recognise that the real threat comes, not from corporate 
groups per se, but only from morally unreliable ones, and 
then seek to ensure that their interests are never regarded as 
morally significant.
To be tenable in a given future, an account of corporate 
groups must both (a) make sense against the background of 
accepted social realities and (b) help future people to avoid 
the worst threats. Non-moralised extreme collectivism is 
extremely dangerous in precisely those digital futures where 
moderate collectivism is least credible—namely those where 
digital persons are ubiquitous—because it threatens to usher 
in the inhuman corporate future, which is perhaps the worst 
possible future of all. (If unreliable corporate groups are 
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recognised as moral persons, then they could easily prolifer-
ate very quickly!)
I argued earlier that any enduring digital society must 
limit digital reproduction and eliminate morally unreliable 
digital beings. While this reduces the risk of an inhuman 
corporate future, it doesn’t eliminate it. It is not sufficient to 
ensure that all individuals are morally reliable, because non-
psychotic individuals can together constitute a psychopathic 
corporate group. (At present, after all, a psychopathic busi-
ness entity might be composed entirely of non-psychopathic 
human individuals.) Digital future people will therefore 
insist on moralised collectivism, where all new corporate 
groups must also pass their own Moral Turing Test. For rea-
sons discussed in "Corporate Groups in Broken Futures" 
section, the moral resources of broken future ethics, which 
digital future ethics shares, make this task much less daunt-
ing than it would be today.
Should We Adopt the Ethics of This Digital Future?
I have argued that future people who recognise (some) digi-
tal beings as moral persons need an account of corporate 
groups that is consistent with that recognition. If one recog-
nises (some) digital persons, then one cannot consistently 
fail to recognise (some) corporate groups as (at least) moral 
agents. Therefore, digital future people will recognise some 
corporate groups as moral agents, and individualism is not 
tenable in digital futures.
I now argue that, because we need a temporally robust 
account of corporate agency that will enable our descendants 
to make sense of their social world, individualism is also not 
tenable for us now.
Whether or not they were persuaded by my arguments in 
"Corporate Groups in Digital Futures" section, many indi-
vidualists will reject this final step. Suppose they grant, for 
the sake of argument, that humans in digital futures would 
believe that some digital beings are persons, and also that 
this belief would lead them to reject individualism about 
corporate groups. Individualists will insist that this merely 
illustrates the obvious point that future people might be 
radically mistaken about metaphysical facts, and that false 
beliefs about digital personhood might infect their beliefs 
about corporate groups. So what? Facts about future beliefs 
provide no reason to change our present beliefs. What mat-
ters is not what imaginary future philosophers might think 
of Searle’s argument, but whether he is correct.
My individualist opponent here is a realist who insists 
that our philosophical goal is to map independent metaphysi-
cal reality. The most robust (if rather unambitious) reply is 
that, while my argument may not persuade realists, it should 
persuade those pragmatists or consequentialists who favour 
individualism (at least in part) because they believe it offers 
the best hope of meeting future challenges. And, as I argued 
in "Embracing Broken Future Ethics" section, the prospect 
of broken futures should make pragmatists and consequen-
tialists of us all!
More ambitiously, I believe that reflection on digital 
futures should give many realists good reason to question 
individualism. Consider a contemporary realist who con-
cedes that moral agency is a function of organisational com-
plexity rather than biological substrate, but who embraces 
individualism because she thinks no existing corporate 
group possesses anywhere near the same degree of organi-
sational complexity as a human brain. This realist might 
agree that future corporate groups consisting of vast num-
bers of interlinked digital beings could very well qualify as 
moral agents or even persons. She would then recognise that, 
despite her present commitment to it, individualism is not 
temporally robust.
This highlights an important respect in which my defence 
of extreme collectivism is less radical than it may appear. I 
have argued that any temporally robust ethic must be both 
extremely inclusive and extremely collectivist. This means 
that it must acknowledge the possibility that future digital 
beings or corporate groups will be full moral persons, and 
deny that there is any in principle objection to digital or cor-
porate personhood. But this is consistent with maintaining 
both that no extant digital entity or corporate group is (even) 
a moral agent and also that it is not inevitable that digital or 
corporate persons will ever emerge.
Conclusion
Our search for a temporally robust account of corporate 
groups has reached a surprising conclusion. The only tempo-
rally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where 
suitably sophisticated morally reliable corporate groups (and 
only those corporate groups) are recognised as both respon-
sible agents and full moral persons. This account alone is 
both intelligible and not-too-dangerous across all the cred-
ible futures we have explored. We should therefore bequeath 
social institutions and moral codes that leave open the pos-
sibility of extreme collectivism and allow for full digital and 
corporate personhood, but also rule out any recognition of 
the agency of morally unreliable corporate groups. We need 
to learn these lessons from credible futures now, because the 
inhuman corporate future can only be avoided by reorienting 
our thinking before morally unreliable digital beings emerge 
and start populating the world with corporate groups whose 
priorities are entirely divorced from any human concerns.
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